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The Politics of the Debate over the Court of 
Final Appeal in Hong Kong 
Lo Shiu Hing 
Before the transfer of Hong Kong's sovereignty from Britain to the 
People's Republic of China (PRC) on 1 July 1997, the politics of 
interpreting the Basic Law had already become apparent. This article 
aims to use the debate over the Court of Final Appeal (COFA), which 
was set up in July 1997 to replace the Privy Council in Britain as the 
court of final adjudication in the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region (HKSAR), to analyse how the Basic Law had already been 
interpreted by PRC officials, their British counterparts and the Hong 
Kong people.' The interpretation of the Basic Law involves many people 
from both Hong Kong and China. As one legal scholar writes: "In one 
sense all kinds of people [in the HKSAR] will have to interpret the Basic 
Law: civil servants and other administrators and lawyers in their day-to- 
day work, legislators to ensure that their legislation and motions are 
consistent with it, the State Council [in the PRC], the National People's 
Congress Standing Committee, even private parties since some provisions 
affect private actsm2 The debate over the COFA may also help towards 
an understanding of the ongoing interpretation of various provisions of 
the Basic Law. which serves as the mini-constitution of the HKSAR. 
Historical Development of the Debate Over the Court of Final Appeal 
The origin of the debate can be traced back to December 1991 when 
the Legislative Council (LegCo) rejected an agreement reached by Britain 
and China on the COFA's composition in Hong Kong, mainly on the 
grounds that the ratio of four local judges to one overseas judge was too 
rigid.3 According to most Hong Kong lawyers, it was unnecessary to 
specify the number of overseas judges in the COFA because the British 
Privy Council did not fix the number of judges on its Judicial Committee. 
1. On 22 July 1997, the Chief Executive of the HKSAR, Tung Chee-hwa, appointed 15 
judges to serve in the COFA. See Xingdao ribao (Sing Tao Dailj), 23 July 1997, p. I .  
2. Yash Ghai, Hong Kong's New Constitutional Order: The Resumption of Chinese 
Sovereignty and the Basic Law (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1997), p. 191. 
3. The agreement decided the 4 to 1 ratio of local judges to overseas judges. Johannes 
Chan wrote: "The 4 to 1 ratio restricts the discretion of the Court conferred on it by the Basic 
Law to decide on the number of overseas judges and is hence in contravention of the Basic 
Law." See Johannes Chan, "Tochange or not tochange: the crumpling legal system," in Ngaw 
Mee-kau and Li Si-ming (eds.), The OtherHong Kong Report 1996 (Hong Kong: The Chinese 
University Press, 1996), p. 22. The debate over the COFA's composition divided the legal 
community; see C. K. Lau, Hong Kong's Colonial Legacy (Hong Kong: The Chinese 
University Press, 1997), p. 149. Apart from the rigidity of the agreement, there were other 
reasons why LegCo rejected it, such as the "violation" of the Basic Law and Sino-British Joint 
Declaration, the questionable status of the COFA, possible interference from the PRC, the 
lack of consultation, and the neglect of the interest of Hong Kong people. See Lo Shiu Hing, 
"The politics of the Court of Final Appeal debate in Hong Kong," Issues & Studies, Vol. 29, 
No. 2 (February 1993), pp. 105-13 1. 
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The Bar Association and the Law Society also believed that the COFA's 
composition and the method of appointing judges to the court should 
remain flexible. 
In March 1995, the Hong Kong government submitted a draft bill to 
Beijing. However this was criticized by China for failing to incorporate 
Article 90 of the Basic Law, which states that the Chief Justice of the 
COFA is a Chinese citizen who is a permanent resident of the HKSAR 
without the right of abode in any foreign ~ o u n t r y . ~  The Hong Kong 
government under the administration of Governor Christopher Patten then 
criticized the Chinese side for delay in approving the draft bill. The Chief 
Secretary of the Hong Kong government, Anson Chan Fang On-sang, 
hinted that it might have to be tabled to legislators in April 1995 because 
of the "tight timetable."5 Chan implied that the bill should ideally be 
passed by the LegCo before a new legislature, entirely composed of 
elected members, was constituted in September 1995. 
In response to Chan's remarks, the vice-director of China's New China 
News Agency in Hong Kong, Zhang Junsheng, warned that any unilateral 
action by the Hong Kong government on the COFA would violate the 
Joint Declaration6 At the same time, there was a deadlock in the 
Sino-British Joint Liaison Group (JLG) which was supervising the im- 
plementation of the Joint Declaration initialled in 1984. The Chinese 
side's leader, Chen Zuo'er, put the blame on the British, complaining that 
it had taken two years for the draft bill to be finalized since the 1991 
agreement.' The British side's representative, Alan Paul, echoed Anson 
Chan's remarks, saying that the Hong Kong government did not exclude 
the possibility of unilaterally submitting the draft bill to the LegCo.' 
As well as this Sino-British procedural dispute, China also had reserva- 
tions about the draft bill's ~ o n t e n t . ~  China asked Britain to specify clearly 
whether the court's jurisdiction would cover cases concerning breaches of 
the mainland Chinese constitution. Above all, PRC officials wished to 
know whether any remedial action would be taken if there was new 
evidence showing that the court's "incorrect" ruling would have an 
undesirable impact on Beijing's relations with the HKSAR." They were 
concerned that the HKSAR courts might interpret the Basic Law in a way 
that could either undermine the central government's interest or ignore its 
4. For Article 90, see The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Adminisrrative Region 
of the People's Republic of China (Hong Kong: The Consultative Committee for the Basic 
Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China, 
April 1990) (hereafter The Basic Law), pp. 33-34. Article 90 also says the appointment of 
judges to the COFA requires the approval of LegCo and the reporting of such appointments 
to China's National People's Congress for record. After the draft bill was submitted to the 
Chinese side, PRC officials raised 15 questions concerning the draft bill. See South China 
Morning Post (SCMP), 17 March 1995, p. 1. 
5. SCMP, 18 March 1995, p. 3. 
6. Ibid. 
7. Xianggang lianhebao (Hong Kong United Daily News), 25 March 1995, p. 1. This 
remark was also made by Lu Ping; see Xianggang lianhebao, 26 March 1995, p. 1. 
8. See SCMP, 25 March 1995, p. 1. 
9. See Eastern Express ( Em ,  28 February 1995, p. 2. 
10. EE, 25-26 March 1995, p. 1. 
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perspective. The PRC insisted that Britain should promise not to table the 
draft bill to the LegCo without Beijing's endorsement. If the British 
adopted any unilateral action, the COFA and even the entire Hong Kong 
legal system, according to the Chinese diplomats, would not be able to 
straddle 1 July 1997." This threat was seen by the JLG's British side as 
a stalling tactic in the talks on the COFA. 
The Sino-British deadlock over the COFA aroused the concern of 
business people in Hong Kong and a minority of politicians in the United 
States. Some potential investors, according to Anson Chan, took the 
"unusual step of ensuring their contracts are not subject to the jurisdiction 
of local court^."'^ An American Senator, Connie Mack, wrote to Gover- 
nor Patten and expressed his worry that "the Hong Kong and Beijing 
governments are moving toward together on a plan that would erode 
judicial independence and jeopardize Hong Kong's common law sys- 
tem."I3 
The deadlock persisted in May 1995 with the British and Chinese sides 
both pointing accusing fingers at each other. The LegCo passed a 
resolution calling for the Hong Kong government to set up the COFA in 
accordance with the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law." In response, 
PRC officials criticized the British for toying with taking unilateral action 
on the COFA, exerting pressure on the Chinese government, deliberately 
leaking information about the JLG's discussion to the Hong Kong media, 
and supporting some "pro-British" LegCo members to pass the LegCo's 
resolution on the COFA." The former British Foreign Secretary, Lord 
Geoffrey Howe, accused Beijing of dragging its feet on reaching an 
agreement with Britain on Hong Kong's COFA and urged China to 
approve the draft bill as soon as possible.I6 
At the same time, there were reports that the COFA would encounter 
a problem in recruiting overseas judges. First, judges of the High Courts 
of England and Australia, and of the Supreme Court of India are not 
permitted to sit on the courts of other countries unless they resign or 
retire." It was suggested that some overseas judges might be reluctant to 
be included in Hong Kong's COFA for fear of being involved in political 
dispute, and this cast doubts on the court's credibility. The credibility 
problem could be overcome if the court were set up and functioned well. 
However an alternative solution of bringing in retired judges would have 
the drawback that their knowledge of legal affairs might not be so 
"updated" as those in office." 
11. Dongfang ribao (Oriental Daily), 25 March 1995, p. 2. 
12. SCMP, 17 March 1995, p. 1. 
13. SCMP, 25 March 1995, p. 4. 
14. Kuai bao (Express Daily), 5 May 1995, p. 2. 
15. See a useful review article, Chris Yeung, "Waiting for the judgment," SCMP, 3 June 

1995, p. 16. 

16. EE, 6-7 May 1995, p. 2. 
17. SCMP, 6 May 1996, p. 4. But judges of the Australian federal courts and state courts 
can sit on courts in Commonwealth countries in the Pacific Ocean, like Tonga. 
18. Editorial, "Recruiting judges," SCMP, 6 May 1996, p. 18. One member of the top 
policy-making Executive Council, Chang Khen-lee, said: "Retired judges will be less up to 
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A breakthrough in the Sino-British negotiation on the COFA was 
eventually made in June 1995. On 3 June, Anson Chan moderated her 
tone, saying that she hoped the COFA bill could be introduced to LegCo 
with the PRC's s ~ p p o r t . ' ~  Although the deal reached by Britain and China 
in 1991 aimed to have the COFA in place by 1993 so that it would be 
fully established by 1997,~' the Hong Kong government now changed its 
stance and emphasized that "there is now only about two years left [and] 
so the point of having it established long before 1997 no longer exist^."^' 
At the same time, the Chinese vice-premier Qian Qichen told Britain's 
Financial Times that the establishment of the COFA should be postponed 
until after 1 July 1997, and that the Privy Council in Britain would remain 
the highest judicial organ of Hong Kong until the termination of British 
sovereignty. Also, Governor Patten no longer insisted that the COFA 
should be established before 1997. He said: "What is imperative, what- 
ever one manages to achieve, is that any court set up in Hong Kong 
should be able to carry out the same role as the Privy Council and that 
there should be, as far as one can manage it, no rupture in the judicial 
arrangements." Patten put the blame on the LegCo for rejecting the 
COFA agreement in 1991, saying that without this "it is almost certainly 
true we would have a Court of Final Appeal up and running today."22 
The British and the PRC sides of the JLG signed a five-point agree- 
ment on the COFA. First, the British side agreed to incorporate the 
suggestions made by the Preliminary Working Committee - a body set up 
by China to handle the territory's transitional affairs after Governor 
Patten put forward his political reform proposals in October 1992 - into 
the COFA bill.23 This British concession satisfied the PRC officials who 
had been alienated by Governor Patten's criticism that the establishment 
of this working committee was legally and politically unnecessary. 
Secondly, as a quid pro quo, the Chinese side agreed to abandon its 
demand for legislative provisions on a "post-verdict remedial mechan- 
ism" to overturn or veto the Hong Kong court's decision on the provision 
of the Basic Law." Thirdly, the British agreed to amend the draft bill on 
the COFA, incorporating Article 19 of the Basic Law which states that 
the COFA "shall have no jurisdiction over acts of state such as defence 
and foreign affair^."'^ Also, the COFA ordinance would not come into 
operation before 30 June 1997. Fourthly, China agreed to give its support 
to the legislative procedures of the COFA before the end of July 1995. 
/o,~irrorrco,ir,,~urd 
date about the legal field. Judges who are yet to retire will be subjected to less influence by 
the Special Administrative Region government because they have secured a job in their 
original country." See SCMP, 6 May 1996, p. 4. 
19. SCMP, 3 June 1995, p. 4. 
20. SCMP, 8 June 1995, p. I .  
21. A spokesman of the Hong Kong government, cited in SCMP, 8 June 1995, p. I. 
22. SCMP, 9 June 1995, p. 1 .  
23. Ming bao (Ming pao), 10 June 1995, p. 2. Also see SCMP, 10 June 1995, p. 1. For 
Pattern's reform proposals, see OurNexr Five Years: The Agendafor Hong Kong (Hong Kong: 
Government Printer, 7 October 1992). 
24. SCMP, 10 June 1995, p. 1 and also p. 2. 
25. The Basic Law, p. 12. 
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Fifthly, the Chief Executive designate (who would be elected in Decem- 
ber 1996 and then replace the British Governor after the end of British 
rule) and the principal officials designate would be, with the participation 
and assistance of the British and Hong Kong governments, responsible 
for arranging the formation of the COFA on 1 July 1997. Finally, China 
agreed that a judicial committee advising the appointment of new judges 
would not have to include the participation of the Chief Executive once 
he or she appointed a new Chief Ju~t ice . '~  
The Sino-British consensus led to an attempt by the liberal democrats 
in the LegCo to initiate a no-confidence motion on the COFA bill, the 
first time in Hong Kong's political history that the British Governor had 
to face such a motion. Although it was rejected, by 35 votes to 17,27 it 
illustrated the fierce opposition of some LegCo members. On 27 July 
1995, the Sino-British accord over the COFA was passed into law by 38 
LegCo members, with 15 members of the Democratic Party and two 
independents (Emily Lau Wai-hing and Lee Cheuk-yan) voting against 
the motion, and three other independents abstaining (Anna Wu Hung- 
yuk, Christine Loh Kung-wai and Frederick Fung Kin-kee).28 The leader 
of the Democratic Party, Martin Lee Chu-ming, proposed that the Chief 
Justice should be empowered to nominate the five judges in the COFA, 
and that the COFA bill should be amended to allow experienced overseas 
judges from non-common law jurisdictions, such as those from the 
Supreme Court in the United States. Meanwhile, the pro-business Liberal 
Party leader Allen Lee Peng-fei sought to amend the COFA bill by 
deleting the formula of four locals to one foreign judge; he proposed that 
the COFA should be composed of a Chief Justice and four judges 
irrespective of their nationality. All of these amendments were defeated 
in L e g c ~ . ' ~  
26. Editorial, "A deal to support," SCMP, 14 June 1995, p. 14. Also see SCMP, 10 June 
1995, p. I. This committee was named Judicial Services Commission before 1 July 1997. It 
is now called Judicial Officers Recommendation Commission. Since 1 July, Sir Joseph 
Hotung and Miss Eleanor Ling have not been appointed to the commission. Peter 
Wesley-Smith wrote: "The reason is purely political, as everyone knows. China could be 
expected to oppose both of them as members." See Wesley-Smith, "The SAR Constitution: 
law or politics," Hong Kong h w Journal, Vol. 27, Part 2 (1997), p. 127. It was reported that 
Sir Joseph Hotung had donated some money in support of the election campaign of the former 
LegCo member Emily Lau, whose political views and critical perspectives alienated the PRC 
officials. The Chief Executive, Tung Chee-hwa, appointed two pro-China politicians to 
replace Sir Joseph and Eleanor Ling. Of the two pro-China politicians, one is the well-known 
Chan Wing-kei, the managing director of the Cheung Kong Manufacturing Factory. Chan's 
pro-Beijing views earned him a position in the 400-member Selection Committee which 
elected the Chief Executive in December 1996. For Chan's background, see Feng Zi, Toushi 
dong jianhua (Luoking through Tung Chee-hn7a) (Xianggang choupijiang chubanshe, July 
1997). p. 266. With the benefit of hindsight, Anne Cheung was accurate in saying that "the 
composition of the [Judicial officers Recommendation] Commission may be tainted by the 
element of executive favouritism instead of adhering to the principle of judicial 
independence." See Anne S. Y. Cheung, "The legal system: falling apart or forging ahead?" 
in Stephen Y.L. Cheung and Stephen M.H. Sze (eds.), The Other Hong Kong Report 1995 
(Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1995), p. 19. 
27. SCMP, 13 July 1995, p. 1. 
28. SCMP, 27 July 1995, p. I. For the content of the COFA Ordinance, see International 
Legal Materials, No. 35 (1996), pp. 207-222. 
29. SCMP, 27 July 1995, p. 5. 
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The Position of the PRC Government and the Hong Kong Government 
From the perspective of the PRC government, reaching a deal with the 
British on the COFA had a number of advantages. First and foremost, 
even though the Sino-British agreement in 1991 committed both sides to 
establishing the COFA before China's resumption of its sovereignty over 
Hong Kong, Beijing preferred the COFA not to "open for business" until 
1 July 1997.30 It regarded the establishment of the COFA as an event 
which should take place at the time when Hong Kong's sovereignty was 
formally returned to China. 
Meanwhile, the court deal not only ameliorated the tense relationship 
between Britain and China but also paved the way for more agreements 
on other outstanding transitional issues. As Chen Ziying, the deputy 
director of the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office (HKMAO), said, 
the COFA deal in 1995 was "not the last nor the only agreement" to be 
truck.^' During his visit to Hong Kong in 1995, the former director of the 
HKMAO, Lu Ping, received a clear message from the local business 
leaders and officials of some foreign consulates that they were deeply 
concerned about Hong Kong's rule of law.32 Once the court deal was 
struck, both local business leaders and foreign investors increased their 
confidence in Hong Kong's future. As the vice-chairman of the Hong 
Kong General Chamber of Commerce, James Tien Pei-chun, said: "We 
hope that the court deal will mark the first step toward greater cooperation 
between China and Britain on other issues, including Container Terminal 
9, 10 and 1 1, as well as the airport f inan~ing ."~~ The Japan Bond Research 
Institute also announced after the COFA deal that China was committed 
to respect Hong Kong's independence in fiscal and monetary policy. With 
the benefit of hindsight, it was in the interest of the PRC to reach the 
COFA agreement with Britain. 
Most importantly, China was concerned about the jurisdiction of the 
COFA. In exchange for the British side's decision to incorporate the 
Basic Law's provision on the "acts of state" into the COFA bill, the PRC 
abandoned the demand that the bill should include a "post-verdict reme- 
dial mechanism," which had been designed by Beijing to protect its 
authority vis-2-vis the HKSAR. The Chinese side raised the issue of the 
"post-verdict remedial mechanism" in May 1995,34 a deliberate tactic to 
maximize the PRC's bargaining power in the JLG. In fact, even without 
the "post-verdict remedial mechanism," the mainland National People's 
Congress (NPC) could play such a function if it has the political will to 
overturn any decision made by the Hong Kong court on provisions of the 
Basic Law. According to Article 158 of the Basic Law, 
30. Jonathan Dimbleby, The Last Governor: Chris Patten and the Handover ofHong Kong 
(London: Little, Brown and Company, 1997), p. 284. 
3 1. SCMP, 13 June 1995, p. 1. 
32. SCMP, 3 June 1995, p. 16. 
33. SCMP, 13 June 1995, p. 1. At that time, the PRC and Britain argued about the 
establishment of the Container Terminals in Hong Kong's Kwai Chung district and the 
financial arrangements concerning the new airport at Chek Lap Kok. 
34. SCMP, 5 May 1995, p. 1. 
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The Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (SCNPC) shall authorize 
the courts of the HKSAR to interpret on their own ... the provisions of this Law 
which are within the limits of the autonomy of the Region. 
The courts of the HKSAR may also interpret other provisions of this Law ... 
However, if the courts of the Region ... need to interpret the provisions of this Law 
concerning affairs which are the responsibility of the Central People's Government, 
or concerning the relationship between the Central Authorities and the Region ..., the 
courts of the Region shall ... seek an interpretation of the relevant provisions from 
the SCNPC through the Court of Final Appeal of the Region. When the Standing 
Committee makes an interpretation of the provisions concerned, the courts of the 
Region ... shall follow the interpretation of the Standing Committee. However, 
judgments previously rendered shall not be affected. 
The SCNPC shall consult its Committee for the Basic Law of the HKSAR before 
giving an interpretation of this Law.35 
Although an expert in constitutional law, Yash Ghai, suggests that the 
SCNPC should play a passive role in interpreting the Basic Law and that 
the Committee for the Basic Law should also not interpret the consti- 
tution before the HKSAR courts make decisions,36 whether the SCNPC 
remains passive will be ultimately a political matter. In the event that its 
members do not favour the interpretation made by the HKSAR courts, the 
former will have either the temptation or the will to overturn the latter's 
interpretation. Politically speaking, when the Hong Kong representatives 
to the NPC have an interpretation of the Basic Law different from that of 
the HKSAR courts - a scenario that cannot be ignored given the political 
activeness of some Hong Kong representatives - they could lobby and 
influence the SCNPC to adopt an active role in interpreting the HKSAR's 
constitution. In short, the interpretation of the Basic Law is vulnerable to 
political influence and wishes, although Yash Ghai advocates that it 
should ideally be " j~dicial ized."~~ 
What is more, mainland Chinese members of the SCNPC could have 
a pro-central government perspective when they decide to interpret the 
Basic Law. During the debate over the COFA in Hong Kong, some 
mainland legal experts demonstrated such a view of the relations between 
the HKSAR and China. One member of the Preliminary Working Com- 
mittee sub-group on constitutional affairs, Xiao Weiyun, said that the 
COFA should be empowered to hear all cases except for those which 
35. The Basic Law,p. 54. 
36. See Yash Ghai, "Framework to judge law," SCMP, 6 October 1997, p. 21. The 
committee has 12 members, half from Hong Kong and the rest from the mainland. The 
problem is that not all the six Hong Kong members are legal experts, such as Wong Po-yan 
and Raymond Wu. See Xianggang xinbao (Hong Kong Economic Journal), 4 October 1997, 
p. 3. It remains unclear whether the non-legal experts and the mainland Chinese members will 
interpret the Basic Law impartially and will consider seriously the opinions of the HKSAR's 
legal profession. One observer notes: "In the event that the CBL has political appointees, the 
opportunities for China to coopt pro-China elements into the committee exist. And in case 
Beijing uses the numerical majority of pro-China members to control the CBL's composition, 
any decision in the committee will be bound to favour the Chinese government." See Lo Shiu 
Hing, The Politics of Democratization in Hong Kong (London: Macmillan, 1997), p. 222. 
37. See Ghai, "Framework to judge law," p. 21. Also see Ghai, Hong Kong's New 
Constitutional Order, pp. 214-220. 
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involve "acts of state" and any "breach of China's con~titution."~~ He did 
not elaborate on the conditions that might constitute a "breach" of the 
constitution. However, he said that if the court could not decide whether 
a case was an "act of state," it could be referred to the Chief Executive 
who would then ask the central government in Beijing for clarification. 
He gave two examples of "acts of state," one concerning the specific 
question of whether staff members of the Taiwan government could stay 
in the HKSAR, and the other regarding court cases that dealt with 
Taiwan's official or semi-official agencies in the territory. Xiao's exam- 
ples, according to the leader of the pro-Beijing Democratic Alliance for 
the Betterment of Hong Kong, Tsang Yok-sing, should not be prejudged 
as "acts of state."39 For Tsang, "acts of state" could be interpreted by the 
HKSAR courts - a view more flexible, less pro-centre and more consider- 
ate of the HKSAR's autonomy than Xiao's. In a nutshell, in the event that 
the mainland Chinese members of the SCNPC interpret "acts of state" 
broadly as including not only foreign affairs and defence but also 
"central-local relations" - a term that is ambiguous and broad enough to 
embrace numerous issues - then the HKSAR's autonomy would be 
necessarily restricted. 
Britain and the PRC had different interpretations of the meaning of 
"acts of state." For the British side, the common law does not allow for 
any "post-verdict remedial mechanism," which runs counter to the prin- 
ciple of res judicata (a matter which has been adjudicated upon cannot be 
re-litigated). In addition, the British publicly disagreed with the mainland 
Chinese interpretation of "acts of state" as including matters other than 
foreign affairs and defence, such as central-local relations." Although it 
can be argued that "in many ways" the PRC's definition of "acts of state" 
"is similar to the common law,"" the British side of the JLG did not go 
so far as the Chinese side in the matters it viewed as falling within the 
ambit of "acts of state." 
Nevertheless, both sides had a common interest to reach a deal on the 
COFA before the new LegCo was elected in September 1995. If the 
COFA bill were postponed to the new LegCo session, it would not be 
passed easily, as from September onwards there would be more directly 
elected LegCo members and the appointed legislators would become a 
thing of the past. As Simon Long put it accurately, "perhaps China and 
Britain also calculate there is more chance of getting their way in this 
[1994-951 LegCo - stacked with appointees and representatives of 'small 
constituencies vulnerable to manipulation' -than in the one that will be 
38. EE, 17 May 1995, p. 2. 
39. K~rai buo, 23 June 1995, p. 2. 
40. Unlike the Chinese, the British had opposing views on the definition of the "acts of 
-
state." See Governor Pattern's remarks reported in Xianggang lianhebao, 25 May 1995, p. 
L. 
41. Ghai argues, for example, that for both the Chinese and British, acts of state refer to 
"a decision to exercise rights in the name of the state by the central government in foreign 
affairs"; "possess distinctive features, involving high-level decision making"; and are "not 
justiciable in the courts." See Ghai, Hong Kong's New Constirlrtional Order, p. 297. 
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elected in Se~ternber."~' In fact, Governor Pattern realized the critical 
importance of the timing in which the COFA bill should be submitted to 
LegCo. He revealed his dilemmas, saying that: 
London accepts the argument for trying to set up a COFA before 1997. After all, we 
negotiated the agreement. But London also wants to minimize the number of rows 
that we have with China. There is still the view - more among diplomats than 
politicians - that if only we could somehow get on better with China, everything 
would be easier and Sino-British relations would produce an aura of sunlight in 
which problems could be solved and trade would be better. 
Here in Hong Kong, we feel very strongly that we've at least got to have a go at 
setting up the court, but we are still dealing with a LegCo which we don't think will 
vote in very large numbers for the court. So do we press ahead on our own without 
Chinese agreement? If we do, and there is a row, can we get the bill through the 
LegCo? What sort of situation is this in which to persuade London that we should 
go ahead? We have a row with China, and we fall flat on our face in the ~ e g c o . " ~  
Another British consideration was, like the PRC's, to pave the way for 
co-operation on other transitional matters. Prior to June 1995, the British 
insisted that the COFA should be set up at least one year before 1997 to 
achieve a of But whensmooth transition the j ~ d i c i a r y . ~ ~  later, they 
realized that there would not be time for the COFA to be established 
before 1997, the alternative of having it established in July 1997 was 
adopted. This move could be interpreted as pragmatic, for the British had 
no choice but to accept the reality that it would be better to have an 
agreement than a situation without any deal. Above all, the COFA deal 
would unlock the door for the PRC's endorsement of more transitional 
affairs in Hong Kong. As Governor Patten stated: 
On its own terms, we believe this agreement to be in the best interests of Hong Kong, 
but having got an agreement, of course we hope that the logjam on other issues can 
be broken. One of the extremely good things about this agreement is that it has got 
round the question of the modality for the adaptation of laws.45 
For the Patten administration, more progress could be made on the 
adaptation of Hong Kong laws, and on the PRC's support of the new 
airport's financial arrangement. Political and economic circumstances 
forced Patten and the JLG's British side to reach an agreement with the 
Chinese side on the COFA. As a commentator put it, "pragmatism and 
expediency are becoming ever more common as Hong Kong's days as a 
British colony draw to a close."46 
42. Simon Long, "A list of people not to trust in the wake of the Court of Final Appeal 
deal," EE, 14 June 1995, p. 14. 
43. Quoted in Dimbleby, The Last Governor, p. 276. Dimbleby also revealed the 
disagreements between Patten and some British government officials, like the President of 
the Board of Trade Michael Heseltine and the British Ambassador in Beijing Sir Len 
Appleyard, over the issue of COFA in Hong Kong (see pp. 277-290). However, since the 
Prime Minister John Major and the Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd were close friends of 
Patten, they trusted him and gave the Governor a final say on how Britain should negotiate 
with the PRC over Hong Kong's political reform and COFA. 
44. EE, 8 June 1995. 
45. Sally Blyth, "Court of Final Appeal may break logjam," EE, 12 June 1995, p. 1 .  
46. Louise do Rosario, "A court too far," Far Eastern Economic Review, 22 June 1995, 
p. 20. 
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Moreover, as for the PRC authorities, the British side of the JLG hoped 
to reach the COFA deal in order to boost the confidence of the local 
business community and foreign investors. Governor Patten reiterated 
that: 
Of course I would have preferred the court to be set up and running earlier. I 
campaigned hard for that. But since that was not possible, the main objective for a 
government which cares about the rule of law in Hong Kong was to set up a court 
with the same jurisdiction, subject to the Basic Law, as the Judicial Committee of the 
Privy Council; to ensure that there would be no legal vacuum on July 1, 1997; and 
to ensure that the detailed legislation implementing the COFA was on the statute 
book as soon as possible, preferably before the end of July this year, to give 
international investors and Hong Kong people the confidence about the COFA which 
they have been seeking. Our agreement does precisely that."' 
Apart from boosting the confidence of local and foreign investors, the 
Patten administration was particularly concerned about its public and 
international image. Reaching the court deal with China could serve the 
purpose of projecting an image of a strong British administration with 
sufficient authority, instead of a weak government which was labelled as 
a "lame duck" by critics during the governorship of Sir David Wilson, 
Patten's predecessor. 
The response from local business leaders and the international com-
munity to the COFA deal was warm and positive. Prior to the agreement 
in 1995, the European Union's representative in Hong Kong said that 
the COFA issue undermined business confidence in Hong Kong." In the 
wake of the deal, 14 leading overseas business groups, including in 
the United States and Australia, issued a letter appealing to the LegCo for 
approval of the COFA bill without amendments." The Washington Post 
said that the agreement was a sign of "en~ouragement."~~ However, not 
all overseas groups were positive towards the COFA deal. The Alliance 
of Hong Kong Chinese in the United States wrote a letter to the editor of 
an English daily in Hong Kong, saying that: 
The Chinese definition of "act of state" is very different from the traditional common 
law definition, which includes only an act of a sovereign state vis-a-vis another 
sovereign state such as a declaration of war. The PRC government has said it will use 
this "act of state" loophole, which Beijing and not the Hong Kong government will 
define, to prohibit the court from exercising jurisdiction over sensitive political 
matters. According to the Hong Kong Basic Law, the Standing Committee of the 
National People's Congress, a rubber-stamp organization under the Chinese Commu- 
nist Party, will have the final say to its interpretation. In this way, the COFA is really 
the Court of not so Final Appeal, and Beijing will, in fact, preserve an all-too-effec- 
tive post-verdict remedial me~han i sm.~ '  
47. Chris Patten, "Protecting the law," SCMP, 15 June 1995, p. 19. Emphasis added. 
48. EE, 9 May 1995, p. 2. 
49. SCMP, 12 July 1995, p. 2. Also see Kuai bao, 12 July 1995, p. 3. 
50. Reported in Kuai bao, 13 June 1995, p. 2. 
5 1. Letter to the editor, "Independence of judiciary threatened," SCMP, 19 July 1995, p. 
16. 
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The British handled the COFA bill in a way parallel to the situation of 
initialling the Sino-British Joint Declaration in September 1984: accept- 
ing the agreement or having no agreement at all. What the British was 
telling LegCo in June 1995 was that, to borrow from Frank Ching, "it has 
no choice but to rubber-stamp the agreement if Hong Kong is to have a 
COFA."~' As Governor Patten put it clearly, "LegCo members now have 
a clear choice. They can either vote this week for a bill which will ensure 
that a proper COFA is set up on July 1, 1997 and that the possibility of 
a judicial vacuum is avoided. Or they can vote for continuing uncer-
taint^."^^ The Attorney-General Jeremy Matthews made similar remarks: 
Members now have a clear choice. Passage of the bill will guarantee the establish- 
ment of a proper court on July 1, 1997, with Sino-British cooperation. The alternative 
of rejecting the bill will leave the establishment of the court to the HKSAR after July 
1, 1997, creating damaging and unnecessary uncertainty about the eventual form of 
the court.'" 
These remarks contradicted Patten's earlier claim that the LegCo would 
have an opportunity to determine the acceptability of the COFA deal. 
Substantially, the LegCo had no choice but to pass it. 
Acts of State 
One inconsistent position of the British side was its attitude towards 
"acts of state." Originally, the British adhered to the common law 
tradition of defining "acts of state" as foreign affairs and defence.55 Later, 
by yielding to the PRC's demand that the COFA bill should incorporate 
Article 19 of the Basic Law - which says that the COFA "shall have no 
jurisdiction over acts of state such as defence and foreign affairs - the 
British tacitly admitted that "acts of state" could include matters in 
addition to foreign affairs and defence. Incorporating Article 19 into the 
COFA bill, the British side confirmed and entrenched the legal basis for 
Beijing to interfere with the HKSAR court's decisions on provisions of 
the Basic Law. Martin Lee made the following criticisms on "acts of 
state": 
In the common law, "acts of state" refer only to things such as declaring war or 
52. Frank Ching, "Patten accord: A Mixed blessing," Far Eusrern Economic Review, 29 
June 1995, p. 36. 
53. Chris Patten, "Court of Final Appeal: the opening argument," SCMP, 26 July 1995, 
p. 19. One commentator said that in the handling of the COFA bill, Governor Patten "has 
shown himself to be just another very ordinary Governor after all. But tongue-in-cheek, he 
danced around boasting a splendid victory he won for Hong Kong. Jesting in LegCo and 
looking oh-so-pleased with himself, hedefinitely looks more like Zhang Junsheng (the NCNA 
vice-director) of the day." See Wing Kay Po, "Governor courting failure after Court of Final 
Appeal," EE, 14 June 1995, p. 15. 
54. SCMP, 15 June 1995, p. 6. 
55. Governor Patten said that "we accept that arguments about the definition of 'acts of 
state' raise important questions about the relationship between the Basic Law and the English 
common law, which China has pledged to uphold in Hong Kong after 1997." See Patten, 
"Protecting the law," SCMP, 15 June 1995, p. 19. 
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making treaties - and the core principle is that it may never be used by the sovereign 
against its own citizens ... As the Court will not be set up before 1997, it is likely 
that China will interpret the jurisdiction over acts of state in such a way that Hong 
Kong people will never be able to challenge the government. This rips the rule of law 
into shreds, since the entire basis for the rule of law is that the government is subject 
to the law just as ordinary citizens are. The SAR government overnight gains a power 
it never had even under the colonial government: the power to act with impunity.56 
Although Martin Lee appeared to be quite clear about China's way of 
interpreting "acts of state," it is uncertain whether the PRC will really 
interpret it in such a manner as to favour the central government in 
Beijing. 
According to E. C. S. Wade, an act of state is "an act of the executive 
as a matter of policy performed in the course of its relations with another 
state, including its relations with the subjects of that state unless they are 
temporarily within the allegiance of the Cr~wn."~ '  Wade's definition 
appeared to be ambiguous, but it implied that an act of state was "an act 
of policy carrying out in foreign More specifically, acts of state 
are "primarily prerogative acts of policy in the field of external affairs -
for example, the declaration of war, the conclusion of a treaty, an 
annexation of territory, the recognition of a foreign sovereign, state or 
g~ve rnmen t . "~~  
In Nissan v. Attorney-General (1968), it was for the court to decide 
whether the executive acts in question were really acts of state.60 In the 
HKSAR, it is unclear whether the local courts will take an active role in 
such a decision. However, it is possible that the HKSAR courts will take 
a passive role in deciding such issues. Article 19 of the Basic Law states: 
The Courts of the Region shall obtain a certificate from the Chief Executive on 
questions of fact concerning acts of state such as defence and foreign affairs 
whenever such questions arise in the adjudication of cases. This certificate shall be 
binding on the Courts. Before arriving such a certificate, the Chief Executive shall 
obtain a certifying document from the Central People's ~ o v e r nmen t . ~ '  
If the HKSAR courts follow the procedures stated in Article 19, their role 
56. Martin Lee, "Courting disaster," SCMP, 14 June 1995, p. 19. 
57. E.C.S. Wade, "Act of state in English law: its relations with international law," British 
Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 15, No. 98 (1934). p. 103, cited in Brian Thompson, 
Constitutional and Administrative Law (London: Blackstone, 1993), p. 98. Also see Hilaire 
Barnett, Constitutional and Administrative Law (London: Cavendish, 1995), p. 18 1. 
58. Thompson, Constitutional and Administrative Law, p. 98. 
59. Stanley De Smith and Rodney Brazier, Constitutional and Administrative Law 
(London: Penguin, 1994), p. 158. For a similar definition, see Barnett, Constitutional and 
Administrutive Law, p. 182. 
60. A.W. Bradley and Keith Ewing, Constitutional and Administrative Law (Essex: 
Longman, 1994), p. 330. In this case, the House of Lords held that the Crown could not use 
the act of state as ajustification toargue that the court did not have jurisdiction over aplaintiff s 
claim that British forces had occupied a hotel in Cyprus. 
61. See The Basic Law, p. 12. Actually, Article 19 of the final version of the Basic Law 
is an improvement to the first draft. See Peter Wesley-Smith, Constitutional and 
Administrative Law (Hong Kong: Longman, 1994), p. 106. 
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may be passive and subordinate to the Chief Executive and the central 
government in Beijing, which can interpret acts of state broadly if it 
wishes to do so. 
In Secretary of State for India v. Sahaba, the Privy Council decided 
against a widow's claim that her husband's property had been seized by 
the East Indian Company. The Privy Council held that "transactions of 
independent states between each other are governed by other laws than 
those which Municipal Courts admini~ te r . "~~ In the event that judges of 
the HKSAR courts adopt the approach in the Sahaba case, the definition 
and scope of acts of state will be up to the decision of the Chief Executive 
and the central government in Beijing. At this juncture, whether the Chief 
Executive is determined to stand up for the autonomy of the HKSAR 
courts vis-2-vis Beijing will become a political matter. 
In the debate over the COFA, both the British authorities and the Hong 
Kong government avoided acknowledging in public that the PRC might 
interpret acts of state broadly or arbitrarily. The British stance was that 
the crux of the problem stemmed not from the COFA bill, but from the 
Basic Law. Pattern publicly defended his position in this way: 
Admittedly, the [COFA] bill and the agreement simply repeat the provisions in the 
Basic Law on "acts of state." This is hardly surprising when even our critics have 
repeatedly urged us to make the bill compatible with the Basic Law. But the Basic 
Law does not give either the Hong Kong or the Chinese governments the power to 
avoid the court's jurisdiction at will. It will be for the courts of the HKSAR to decide 
what is, or is not, an act of state.63 
In the same vein, Matthews contended that "what the court bill does is to 
repeat what is in the Basic Law as regards 'acts of state,' so there has 
been no trading away, no giving away of the common law definition of 
'acts of state'."64 
In public, both Governor Patten and Matthews argued that the British 
did not collaborate with the Chinese on the Basic Law's provision 
regarding acts of state. They merely put the blame on the Basic Law. As 
quoted above, Patten openly interpreted the Basic Law as allowing the 
HKSAR courts "to decide what is, or is not, an act of state." However, 
what Patten did not reveal was that, according to Article 158 of the Basic 
Law, the SCNPC "shall authorize the courts of the HKSAR to interpret 
on their own, in adjudicating cases, the provisions of this Law which are 
within the limits of the autonomy of the R e g i ~ n . " ~ ~  That the SCNPC has 
the final power to interpret the Basic Law was played down by Patten. 
62. Ibid. p. 93. 
63. Chris Patten, "Hong Kong's future," letter to the editor, Economist, 24 June 1995. For 
a similar view expressed by Patten, see Xin bao, 12 June 1995, p. 2. The Director of the 
Administration of the Hong Kong government, Richard J.F. Hoare, also wrote a number of 
letters to respond to public criticisms on the COFA deal. See his letters to the editor of the 
SCMP, 6 July 1995, p. 16; 24 July 1995, p. 18; and 31 July 1995, p. 16. 
64. No Kwai-yan and Quinton Chan, "No to backdown over acts of state," SCMP, 10 June 
1995, p. 3. 
65. The Basic Law,p. 32. 
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Most importantly, according to a biographer of Patten, the Governor 
"later ... came to regret his decision to allow the Chinese to incorporate 
the 'acts of state' clause into the COFA bill - a lapse of judgment which 
perhaps should be attributable more to the intense and sustained pressure 
imposed on him by London and Beijing than to any indifference to the 
potential consequences of his retreat from what had once been an 
important p r i n~ ip l e . "~~  If Patten did feel regretful of his concession to the 
PRC, this demonstrated that, as a non-legal expert, he had not anticipated 
the potentially far-reaching consequences of tacitly agreeing with the 
PRC's position that acts of state could include matters other than foreign 
affairs and defence. 
The Views of the Hong Kong People 
The opinion of the Hongkongers was split among different groups: the 
top policy-making Executive Council (ExCo); legal experts; liberal 
democrats and independent legislators; pro-China elite; business people; 
and ordinary citizens. None of the ExCo members spoke up publicly 
about the COFA except for Denis Chang Khen-lee, who pointed out that: 
There is no legal basis for thinking that all acts of the executive authorities are 
outside the pale of law. Indeed, Article 35 of the Basic Law provides that Hong Kong 
residents shall have the right to institute legal proceedings in the courts against the 
acts of the executive authorities and their personnel.67 
While emphasizing the ability of individual citizens to take court action 
against the acts of the executive, Chang shared the assumption of the 
Patten administration that the HKSAR courts would have the jurisdiction 
to interpret provisions of the Basic Law. 
The legal experts' views of the COFA ranged from conservative to 
liberal. At the conservative end of the spectrum was Simon Ip Sik-on, 
who changed his views after the 1991 agreement to become very support- 
ive of the COFA bill, for he believed that the stability of Hong Kong's 
legal system could be best maintained by having a COFA rather than no 
agreement at The president of the Law Society, Roderick Woo Bun, 
maintained that the debate over the definition of "acts of state" was 
"technically irrelevant," because the Basic Law's provision that the 
COFA "shall have no jurisdibtion over acts of state" could not be 
a1 tered.69 
At the liberal end of the spectrum was the chairperson of the Bar 
Association, Gladys Li Chi-hei. She maintained that there was little 
66. Dimbleby, The Last Gover.nor, p. 289. This principle was that the British side should 
neither yield on "acts of state" nor include it in the COFA bill. 
67. Denis Chang Khen-lee, "The COFA draft bill and 'acts of state'," Ming bao, 20 June 
1995, p. C6. Cited in Richard Hoare's letter to the editor, "Passing bill in best interests of Hong 
Kong," SCMP, 1 July 1995, p. 16. 
68. Kuai bao, 4 May 1995, pp. 2 and 5. 
69. SCMP, 25 July 1995, p. 2. 
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flexibility in the COFA's composition of judges; that the bill did not 
conform to the Basic Law; that the Chief Justice should not preside over 
the judicial committee which would select the judges; that the definition 
of "acts of state" was ambiguous and much broader than its meaning 
under the common law; and that the judges should be selected indepen- 
dently of the Chief Justice and free from the executive branch's 
infl~ence.~'  
Between these two extremes, some legal scholars argued that the 
COFA bill, even if it was passed by LegCo, would not be able to straddle 
1997 "as a valid piece of legislation under conditions set out by the Basic 
Law." Peter Wesley-Smith stressed that the Basic Law stated "laws 
previously in force in Hong Kong" would be adopted as HKSAR's laws. 
However, since the COFA Ordinance would not be in force before 1 July 
1997, Wesley-Smith argued, it would not be covered by this provision of 
the Basic Law. This view was rejected by the government's Deputy 
Solicitor-General, Robert Allcock, who revealed that there were some 
differences between the Chinese and English versions of the Basic Law, 
with the former referring to "laws existing" at 1 July 1997 and the latter 
saying "laws previously in force." Allcock said: "There is no suggestion 
in the Chinese text that any ordinance enacted before July 1, but not 
brought into operation, does not carry forward after the transition."" 
Clearly, the crux of the matter was how to interpret the Basic Law's 
provisions on legislation straddling 1 July 1997.72 Even before the 
formation of the HKSAR, the Basic Law had already been interpreted in 
varying ways by the Hong Kong elites, British officials and PRC author- 
ities. 
The liberal democrats were critical of the COFA agreement reached by 
Britain and China in 1995. They complained that as long as the COFA 
would not have the power of interpretation over issues "such as defence 
and foreign affairs," the SCNPC could interpret these issues broadly and 
thus favourably to the central government in Beijing. Martin Lee accused 
70. Kuai bao, 27 June 1995, p. 2. Also see SCMP, 7 July 1995, p. 6. Li's opinions on law 
and politics are a far cry from her father Simon Li Fook-sean, a former judge and a member 
of the Preparatory Committee which was set up by China to handle Hong Kong's transitional 
affairs. See Alison Nadel, "Poles apart in the family court," Sunday Morning Post, 5 May 
1996, p. 2. 
71. EE, 13 June 1995. LegCo member Simon Ip also implicitly agreed with Allcock's view. 
Ip remarked: "There is not a problem. First, once the bill is enacted it will be law, even though 
it will not come into operation or establish the COFA until 1 July 1997. The legislative 
procedures for the COFA bill will have been completed. It does not require another enactment 
for it to be effective after the handover. If one does not accept the first point, there is a second: 
that the Basic Law provisions about the transition of laws are not exclusive, they do not imply 
laws not yet in force cannot straddle the changeover." See EE, 14 June 1995, p. 2. 
72. Article 8 says, "The laws previously in force in Hong Kong, that is, the common 
law, rules of equity, ordinances, subordinate legislation and customary law shall be 
maintained, except for any that contravene this Law, and subject to any amendment by the 
legislature of the HKSAR." See The Basic Law,p. 7. Article 18 also states that "The laws 
in force in the HKSAR shall be this Law, the laws previously in force in Hong Kong as 
provided for in Article 8 of this Law, and the laws enacted by the legislature of the Region." 
The Basic Law, p. 1 1.  
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Governor Patten as a leader much "weaker" than Governor Wilson 
because Patten failed to stand up for the interest of Hong Kong concern- 
ing the definition of acts of state.73 
The liberal democrats rejected the PRC's interpretation that acts of 
state would include central-local relations, an ambiguous term allowing 
considerable room for Beijing to interfere with the decisions of the 
HKSAR courts. Some members of the Democratic Party, who were also 
district board members and urban councillors, protested against the Hong 
Kong government's attempt to "consult" their opinion on the COFA. 
Some district board members walked out of the consultative session and 
asked the Director of Administration, Richard Hoare, to clarify the 
definition of acts of state.74 
The liberal democrats were angry about the government's claim that 
there would be a "judicial vacuum" after 1 July 1997 if the COFA bill 
were not approved by L e g C ~ . ~ j  For the democrats, the claim was simply 
a threat used by the Patten administration to lobby for support of the 
COFA. Last but not least, the liberal democrats were alienated by the 
government's ultimatum, which according to Patten gave two choices, 
namely accepting the Sino-British deal on the COFA or facing the 
prospect of the "judicial vacuum." 
The liberal-minded and independent LegCo members, like Christine 
Loh and Emily Lau, criticized the British authorities for allowing the 
PRC, not the HKSAR, to enjoy the final power of interpreting the Basic 
Law. Loh wrote in June 1995: 
The COFA, if established now, could set precedents on what constitute "acts of state" 
which might create inconvenience for the Central People's Government. China will 
also totally control appointments to the COFA. This is a key victory, since China 
identifies strongly with controlling the individuals who are appointed to high office.76 
Loh believed that the legal systems in Hong Kong and China were so 
different that "one country, two systems" would probably not be feas- 
ible.77 If Hong Kong and the PRC do have two fundamentally different 
constitutional traditions and attitudes towards political rights of groups 
and individual^,^^ divergent interpretations of the Basic Law between the 
liberal democrats - who were mostly educated in the Anglo-American 
system and who accept the Western legal tradition - and PRC officials 
must persist. 
Members of the pro-China elite in Hong Kong tended to be generally 
73. See Ming bao, 13 June 1995, p. A4. 
74. See Kuai bao, 16 June 1995, p. 5; and 20 June 1995, p. 3. Also see EE, 16 June 1995, 
p. 2. 
75. Xianggang lianhrbao, 13 June 1996, p. 4. 
76. Christine Loh, "Will COFA deal leave Hong Kong happy ever after?'EE, 15 June 
1995, p. 15. 
77. See Xianggang lianhebao, 30 June 1995, p. 2. 
78. See Michael C. Davis, Constitutional Confrontation in Hong Kong (London: 
Macmillan, 1989). Also see David Clark's review article, "Taking the Basic Law seriously?' 
Asian Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 12, No. 2 (December 1990), pp. 256-270. 
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more sympathetic towards and supportive of the PRC's official interpret- 
ation of the Basic Law. Occasionally, however, the pro-China elites had 
their own views independent of the mainland official line. For example, 
the leader of the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong, 
Tsang Yok-sing, defended China's position, asserting that it had already 
been "flexible" in its attitude towards when the COFA should operate.79 
Yet, Tsang and Tam Yiu-chung, his vice-chairman, opposed in public 
the Chinese idea of having the "post-verdict remedial mechanism" to 
veto the COFA's rulings.80 Their views differed from the official line of 
the Chinese Communist Party." Other pro-China elites, such as the 
former judge of the Court of Appeal Simon Li Fook-sean, supported 
the Chinese official line on acts of state. Li said that any change in its 
definition should "require the centre's appro~al."~' Li's pro-central 
government view was shared by Tam Yiu-chung, who commented that 
acts of state should include not only defence and foreign affairs but also 
"issues under the responsibility of the central government [in Beiji~~g]."~" 
Interestingly, Simon Li also expressed his personal view on the issue of 
judicial independence in Hong Kong, saying he regretted that Beijing 
"did not retain in the Basic Law a common-law provision allowing an 
appeal against a government decision to deem something an act of state, 
standard practice under the common law but not under Chinese law."84 In 
general, the pro-China Hong Kong elite had mixed feelings on the PRC's 
position on the COFA. 
The business people, like the pro-China elites, did not want to envisage 
any instability and uncertainty in Hong Kong's legal system. For exam- 
ple, Liberal Party members initiated a motion in LegCo urging the Hong 
Kong government to make the composition of judges in the COFA more 
flexible than the 1991 Sino-British arrangement. However, some mem- 
bers of the Liberal Party did not wish to vote against the COFA bill in 
1995 for fear that doing so would undermine business confidence and 
exacerbate Sino-British relations. Thus, before the vote in the LegCo on 
27 July 1995, some Liberal Party members such as James Tien and Henry 
Tang Ying-yen declared support of the COFA bill and opposition to any 
amendment^.^^ The Patten administration regarded the Liberal Party's 
79. Xianggang lianhebao, 9 June 1995, p. 4. 
80. Xianggang lianhebao, 5 May 1995, p. 2. 
81. One commentator concludes that the DAB represents "the Hongkongized version of 
the CCP." Lo Shiu Hing, "Political parties in a democratizing polity: the role of the 
'pro-China' Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong," Asian Journal of 
Political Science, Vol. 4, No. 1 (June 1996), p. 12 1. 
82. See Ming bao, 13 June 1995, p. A4. His remarks were in response to Christine Loh's 
view that "acts of state" should include "only defence and foreign affairs." Li was one of the 
contenders for the position of the Chief Executive of the HKSAR in December 1996 and he 
was defeated. Tung Chee-hwa, a shipping tycoon, won the election, and became the Chief 
Executive-designate. On 1 July 1997, Tung was sworn in as the first Chief Executive of the 
HKSAR. 
83. Ming bao, 13 June 1995, p. A4. 
84. See "Courting disaster," Far Eastern Economic Review, 22 June 1995, p. 5. 
85. Sunday Morning Post, 23 July 1995, p. I .  
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position as crucial to the smooth passage of the COFA bill, although the 
position of other independent LegCo members was deci~ive. '~  Eventually, 
the Liberal Party sought to amend the COFA bill. Before the deal was 
reached, the Liberal Party's leader Allen Lee said that establishing the 
COFA "would be beneficial to both China and B~itain."~' But only five 
of the 15 members of the Liberal Party supported his amendment to the 
bill; most gave the bill unconditional support - a symbol of the Hong 
Kong business sector's pragmatism and political c~nservatism.~' 
In the final analysis, the masses generally did not understand the 
technical issues surrounding the COFA bill. As a result, they were 
relatively apathetic, leaving the debate to politicians and the legal pro- 
fession. A survey of 506 citizens conducted by the University of Hong 
Kong's Social Science Research Centre showed that over half of them did 
not understand the content of the COFA agreement reached by Britain 
and China, although 40 per cent agreed the number of overseas judge in 
the COFA should be restricted to only one.89 Martin Lee asserted that the 
Democratic Party's amendments to the COFA bill were in the interests of 
the Hong Kong people; nevertheless, the majority of the ordinary people 
did not really understand and appreciate the significance of these amend- 
m e n t ~ . ~ ~  
Conclusion 
The entire debate over the COFA was highly political in the sense that 
the PRC, the British side of the JLG, the Patten administration and Hong 
Kong's politicians all struggled for the authority and power to interpret 
provisions of the Basic Law. Controversies surrounding the COFA's 
composition and the definition of "acts of state" demonstrated the concern 
of local politicians and the legal profession about judicial independence 
and the rule of law in the HKSAR. During the transition period from 
September 1984 to 30 June 1997, when the Basic Law was not in 
operation and when there was no authoritative mechanism that could 
arbitrate any dispute between Britain and the PRC concerning its in- 
terpretation, each side had its own interpretation. Nevertheless, both sides 
sensed the political imperative and economic necessity of reaching a deal 
on the COFA. Because of the political expediency of reaching the COFA 
86. See EE, 10-1 1 June 1995, p. 2. One senior government official said that he expected 
the Liberal Party to face the pressure from business people and functional constituencies (like 
business, industrial and commercial groups) to change the party's position on the COFA bill. 
87. Kuai bao, 17 June 1995, p. 5. 
88. Allen Lee himself admitted after the LegCo vote that managing the Liberal Party was 
"more difficult than anticipated." See SCMP, 29 July, 1995, p. 15. 
89. Xianggang lianhebao, 15 June 1995, p. 2. 
90. For Martin Lee's assertion, see his "COFA: the opening arguments," SCMP, 26 July 
1995, p. 19. In fact, the South China Morning Post tended to be quite pro-administration and 
critical of those who opposed the COFA deal reached by Britain and China. See editorial, 
"Bill's critics wrong," SCMP, 22 July 1995, p. 14; and editorial, "Defining acts of state," 
SCMP, 27 July 1995, p. 16. 
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agreement, the Hong Kong people were largely excluded from any 
consultation. That ordinary citizens did not understand the content of the 
debate over the COFA could be partly attributable to the fact that Britain 
and the PRC dictated the agreement with cosmetic consultation with 
politicians and the legislature. The option presented by Britain and China 
to Hong Kong's politicians and legal profession was either accepting the 
deal or having no agreement at all. Constrained by the political legacy of 
his predecessors who reached the 1991 Sino-British arrangement on the 
COFA, Governor Patten had little choice but to push forward the COFA 
deal, selling it to Hong Kong's politicians, the legal profession and the 
foreign community in the name of maintaining the rule of law beyond 1 
July 1997. While the COFA was supported by the business community in 
Hong Kong, Governor Patten and the British side of the JLG failed to 
push the Chinese diplomats to define "acts of state" in a way that was 
acceptable to critics of the COFA agreement in 1995. 
The COFA debate showed that Hong Kong's political activists had 
divergent views on the definition of "acts of state" and the acceptability 
of the COFA agreement. This heterogeneous characteristic of Hong 
Kong's politicians implied that constitutional interpretation in the HK- 
SAR is going to mean both a crisis and an opportunity. A crisis will 
sooner or later emerge when PRC officials and mainland legal experts 
adopt a pro-centre perspective in interpreting the Basic Law, and when 
some members of the pro-Beijing Hong Kong elite uncritically support 
such a pro-centre interpretation. Ironically, however, an opportunity will 
be created when the liberal democrats, independent politicians and some 
legal experts interpret the Basic Law in such a way as to maximize the 
HKSAR's autonomy. If so, the politicization of interpreting the HK- 
SAR's Basic Law is destined to be inevitable. 
